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language use - which argues not only that speech simultaneously carries content and performs actions, but
also that the two functions inevitably depend on each other. It then provides an example of the
interdependence of knowledge and action in an excerpt of classroom conversation. The paper concludes that
knowledge-based approaches underestimate how deeply knowledge and action interpenetrate in the
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Knowledge and Action in Classroom Practice: 
A Dialogic Approach 
Stanton Wortham
Bates College
In 1987, Lee Shulman and Hugh Sockett had an important exchange in the Harvard
Educational Review.1 Shulman argued for the central role of knowledge in good teaching. 
Sockett responded that good teaching cannot be understood as primarily a matter of 
knowledge and skills, because it centrally involves moral action in particular contexts. 
This essay sharpens the question of whether knowledge-based or action-based approaches 
make better sense of educational practice, by considering the power of classroom speech
to communicate knowledge and to perform actions. The paper first describes M.M. 
Bakhtin's dialogic theory of language use - which argues not only that speech 
simultaneously carries content and performs actions, but also that the two functions 
inevitably depend on each other. It then provides an example of the interdependence of 
knowledge and action in an excerpt of classroom conversation. The paper concludes that 
knowledge-based approaches underestimate how deeply knowledge and action 
interpenetrate in the classroom.  
Shulman and Sockett agree that good teachers use judgment to react to particular 
classroom situations. They disagree, however, on what such judgment involves. Sockett 
argues that teacher judgment cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge or rules for 
practice. Teachers judge and react to situations that involve the actions of students as 
moral agents, and this moral dimension cannot be fully captured by propositional 
descriptions. Shulman acknowledges that a moral perspective might illuminate some 
aspects of teaching practice. But he argues that knowledge and rational deliberation form 
the core of teacher judgment and classroom practice.  
Sockett argues that the essence or core of classroom practice goes beyond the knowledge 
implemented and learned, and involves both knowledge and action in particular socio-
moral contexts. But how could we demonstrate the need for an action-based, morally 
informed approach to classroom practice? Shulman and others who focus on knowledge 
do not deny the moral and interactional aspects of classroom practices. They argue that 
morality and interaction can be analytically separated from the knowledge implemented 
and learned in classroom practice, and that knowledge and rational deliberation are the 
key to educational practice. Because Shulman and Sockett start from such fundamentally 
different assumptions, it is impossible to disprove one or the other position in a short 
paper. This essay has a more modest aim: to support Sockett by showing that knowledge 
and action cannot be disentangled as easily as Shulman suggests. The argument focuses 
on language use - the primary medium of both cognitive content and moral action in the 
classroom. By describing Bakhtin's action-based account of language use, and applying 
this account to one classroom example, this essay shows how moral action in classroom 
conversation penetrates deeply into what might appear to be neutral knowledge.  
BAKHTIN'S DIALOGIC APPROACH TO SPEECH
This section argues that knowledge and action are deeply entangled in verbal practice. All 
speech functions both to communicate content or knowledge and to establish 
relationships in socio-moral context. This section sketches Bakhtin's account of language 
use, in order to show how deeply these two functions interconnect. Bakhtin argues that 
the meaningfulness of speech depends on the moral action performed by that speech.2 He 
calls his approach "dialogic," and contrasts it with the predominant "monologic" 
approach. Monologic accounts act as if speech is "the word of no one in particular" - as if 
the social position of the speaker is irrelevant to its meaning. Consider the following 
example: a government spokesperson, reporting events in an ongoing war, who says that 
"there was some collateral damage yesterday" (TDI, 276). From a monologic point of 
view, we would understand this utterance by interpreting the content or knowledge it 
communicates. "Collateral damage" is a military euphemism for "unintended civilian 
casualties," so the spokesperson is referring to civilian casualties suffered the day before.  
For Bakhtin, such monologic approaches cannot explain meaningful speech. "The 
expression of an utterance can never be fully understood or explained if its thematic 
content is all that is taken into account. The expression of an utterance always responds
to a greater or lesser degree, that is, it expresses the speaker's attitude towards others' 
utterances and not just his attitude toward the object of his utterance" (SGE, 92). An 
utterance does always communicate content, but it also always contributes to the 
speaker's position with respect to others - and this socio-moral positioning is essential to 
the meaning of the utterance. In other words, we cannot fully understand the content or 
knowledge a speaker communicates without taking into account various aspects of the 
interactional event in which it occurs.  
Bakhtin's approach is "dialogic" because it describes how any utterance opens up a 
dialogue with others who have taken positions on similar topics. "Collateral damage," for 
instance, is a phrase associated with certain types of speakers - particularly those 
connected to the military, who often present dead civilians as an unintended but 
inevitable consequence of war.3 Such speakers (for example, military strategists and 
spokespeople) are not represented in the utterance at all. They are presupposed, as part of 
the interactional event of speaking. These military-affiliated speakers need not be 
physically present in the briefing room, because they are part of the social world known 
and inhabited by everyone in the event of speaking itself. This social world also contains 
critics of military action that endangers civilians. These, too - even if they are not actually 
present in the briefing room - are indexed by the phrase "collateral damage," as the group 
opposed to the military's acceptance of civilian casualties.  
In order to understand what the speaker means by the utterance, according to Bakhtin, we 
must understand what position the briefer is taking up, with respect to the military and the 
critics in the interactional event of speaking. Does she use this phrase in a straightforward 
referential way, as military personnel generally do? If so, how would she respond to those 
who decry this euphemism for the intolerable evils of war? Does she use the phrase 
instead in a mocking or ironic way, and thus place herself against politicians and soldiers 
who use the phrase merely referentially? These questions describe a rudimentary 
dialogue opened by the use of that one phrase. In order to understand the full meaning of 
the phrase as uttered by this particular speaker, we must understand the social position 
the speaker occupies with respect to other speakers who have used the same words, and 
with respect to others in the audience who might respond in the interactional event of 
speaking. Meaning is dialogic, then, because it goes beyond the denotational content of 
an utterance to the social position taken by the speaker in saying what he or she says.
But is the inevitable positioning that goes on in conversation really integral to the 
knowledge communicated in that conversation? The next section will address this 
question more directly, but we need first to elaborate Bakhtin's approach in more detail. 
Bakhtin explores the dialogic aspects of meaning using two central concepts: voice and 
double voicing. Bakhtin begins his definition of "voice" by observing the "internal 
stratification" of language, which he also calls "heteroglossia." "Heteroglossia" refers to 
the natural state of language, where any given language contains forms associated with a 
wide variety of social groups. "All words have the 'taste' of a profession, a genre, a 
tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the 
day and hour. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its 
socially charged life" (TDI, 289). The social world is composed of many, overlapping 
social groups - such as religious groups, family groups, and ethnic groups. These groups 
can generally be defined by social position and by ideological commitments. "Certain 
features of language take on the specific flavor" of particular groups (TDI, 276). "Dude," 
for instance, would not normally be a word used by elderly Episcopalians. In speaking, 
we inevitably use words that have been used by others, words that (in Bakhtin's colorful 
metaphors) "taste of" or "echo with" the social locations and ideological commitments 
carried by those earlier uses. Note that there are as many voices as there are recognizable 
types of people in a society. This set constantly gains and loses members over time.  
We can now formulate the first part of Bakhtin's theory: An utterance has meaning in part 
because of the voices it indexes or echoes with. This alone, however, does not make the 
theory dialogic. We also need the concept of "double voicing," from Bakhtin's theory of 
the novel.4 Double voicing is the process through which novelists represent voices, as 
well as the process through which voices develop through contact with others. Double 
voiced discourse "has a twofold direction - it is directed both toward the referential object 
of speech, as in ordinary discourse, and toward another's discourse, toward someone
else's speech" (PDP, 185). In double-voiced discourse the speaker's meaning emerges in 
part through an interaction with the voice of another, as the speaker layers his own 
intonations over the still live words of another (PDP, 74).
Novels are built around double-voiced discourse. Bakhtin offers the following simple 
illustration from Book 2, Chapter 12 of Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit:
It was a dinner to provoke an appetite, though he had not had one. The rarest dishes, 
sumptuously cooked and sumptuously served; the choicest fruits, the most exquisite 
wines; marvels of workmanship in gold and silver, china and glass; innumerable things 
delicious to the senses of taste, smell, and sight were insinuated into its composition. O,
what a wonderful man this Merdle, what a great man, what a master man, how blessedly 
and enviably endowed - in one word, what a rich man! (TDI, 304). 
In Bakhtin's analysis, this passage begins with a "parodic stylization of high epic style." 
The first two sentences might echo the thoughts of Merdle himself - Merdle the self-
satisfied businessman, who fancies himself as important as royalty. The italicized portion 
is "a chorus of his admirers in the form of the concealed speech of another." These words 
echo with the voice of Merdle's hypocritical admirers, who sing his praises only because 
they want to share his wealth and fame. Bakhtin calls the last seven words "authorial 
unmasking." Here Dickens replaces all the earlier praises with the single word "rich," and 
thus shows the irony of Merdle's view of himself and the hypocrisy of his sycophants.  
In this passage, then, Dickens juxtaposes at least three voices: Merdle, his admirers, and 
those like Dickens himself who appreciate the irony of the situation. Dickens describes 
Merdle and his fawning admirers using cues (largely a modified form of quoted speech, 
which represents the thoughts or words of characters as if they were being spoken) that 
index certain groups in the socially stratified world: self-satisfied businessmen and their 
sycophants. In this passage, Dickens' descriptions are double voiced. They describe their 
referential objects, carry presuppositions about the voices or social positions of the 
characters, and establish a social position for Dickens himself with respect to those other 
voices. Because Dickens takes a position, the characters and the author have a "dialogue," 
at the level of the social positions that their words represent. In this case, the dialogue is 
relatively simple: Self-satisfied businessmen like Merdle admire themselves for their 
worldly success; their sycophants admire them for this too; but people like Dickens think 
this admiration is ridiculous, and really a disguise for base materialist motives.  
Note that Dickens makes his point in this passage by positioning himself with respect to 
others, not by representing the point propositionally. In later work, Bakhtin argues that all 
our utterances - not just novelists' - are "filled with others' words....These words of others 
carry with them their own expression, their own evaluative tone, which we assimilate, 
rework, and re-accentuate" (SGE, 89). This "re-accentuation" is a matter of interactional 
positioning, not representation of content. Part of any utterance's meaning involves action,
as that utterance positions the speaker with respect to other voices in the interactional 
event of speaking. In order to understand what the military briefer meant we must go 
beyond knowledge of what "collateral damage" refers to, and appreciate how she was 
positioning herself socially. In order to understand Dickens, we must appreciate the 
positioning accomplished through his language. If Bakhtin's account is to support 
Sockett's arguments for the centrality of moral action in classroom practice, however, two 
issues must be addressed. First, does Bakhtin's theory really apply beyond novelistic 
discourse, to classroom speech? Second, does the positioning Bakhtin describes really 
penetrate the knowledge communicated in, and learned through, classroom speech, or 
does it simply occur alongside a cognitive "core?"  
DIALOGIC SPEECH IN THE CLASSROOM
This section addresses these two questions, by applying Bakhtin's approach to an 
example of classroom talk. This example occurred in a ninth grade history class, in an 
urban American public school. Two white teachers are leading a class of mostly lower 
class black students. Students have read selections from Plutarch's "Life of Lycurgus." 
This text describes the Spartan political system, in which the society was more highly 
valued than the individual. Sparta was ruled by a committee of elders, called "Ephors," 
who made decisions on behalf of the community. In this classroom conversation, the 
students object strongly to one particular Spartan practice: Each newborn had to be 
brought to the Ephors for judgment; if they felt the child was sickly and would likely be a 
burden on the society, the baby was left outside to die of exposure. The classroom 
discussion raises the question of whether a society should support disadvantaged 
members, or whether those members should be sacrificed for the good of the whole. As 
we try to understand the students' and teachers' utterances dialogically - with respect to 
the interactional positions they adopt in the classroom - we will see that the relationship 
between disadvantaged and more privileged members of society plays an important role.  
The teachers defend Sparta's treatment of unhealthy infants. Right before the segment in 
question, one teacher argues that "if a baby is going to be a problem in the future...you 
get rid of it." A student responds with the following example.5
ST: if she had a baby and hers lived and I had a baby and mine didn't. we not equal.  
T1: yeah you're right. you didn't produce a healthy baby.  
T2: that's right.  
ST: how do you know that. they just say that one ain't healthy. and then lookit. mine 
probably grew up to be taller and stronger.
T2: because they're the Spartan Ephors who make a decision. the Ephors know what 
makes a good Spartan because they're sixty years old and they've seen an awful lot.
The student, "Jasmine," introduces herself as a hypothetical Spartan mother in this 
example. She also nominates another student as a second hypothetical Spartan mother.  
After Jasmine introduces this example, there are two types of represented content in play: 
the text, which describes Spartan society, including relations among Ephors and citizens; 
and the example, which describes the two students' hypothetical babies and how the 
Ephors might treat them. The example describes two types of relationships, and three 
general voices. There is the relationship between the two hypothetical Spartan mothers - 
one of whom must leave her unhealthy-looking child to die of exposure, while the other 
gets to keep her child. This is a relationship between the out-of-favor and the favored, or 
between the unprivileged and the privileged. The other relationship is between the 
mothers and the Ephors. This is a relationship between the subordinate and the powerful.
A monologic account would focus only on these two types of represented content. It 
might explore the relationship between the conceptual structure set up in the example and 
that in the text, to see whether the example helped students grasp the thematic contents of 
the text. But it would not attend to the classroom interaction among teachers and students. 
According to Bakhtin, we cannot fully understand the meaning of teachers' and students' 
utterances unless we also attend to the types of people who might make similar utterances, 
and to the implications of these utterances for teachers' and students' own interactional 
positions.  
In exploring the dialogic meaning of this case, we must look for connections between the 
content represented and the action performed by the students' and teachers' speech. Note 
that the example of Jasmine's baby includes some of the speakers participating in the 
classroom interaction itself. The example doubles the roles played by Jasmine and Erika. 
Jasmine, for instance, now has two identities in this classroom conversation: as a student 
participating in class discussion, and as a hypothetical Spartan mother. As we will see, 
comments about Jasmine's character within the example come to have implications for 
Jasmine herself. We can begin to see these implications in the following excerpt, which 
occurs soon after Jasmine gives her example.  
T1: wait a second. you're baby's going to grow up and be this unhealthy runt. her baby's 
going to grow up and be healthy.
JAS: I'm equal to her then
T1: yeah you're equal. but you know take it twenty years in the future. her baby's going to 
have to do what for your baby. your baby's going to do what. lay around.  
STS: hahahaha drinking beer
T1: drinking beer - eating their bean soup. 
If we read this monologically, as represented content, the students and teacher are simply 
elaborating the pro-Spartan argument here. They articulate the Spartans' reasoning, by 
imagining how an unhealthy baby would become a burden on the society. If we examine 
implications for the classroom interaction itself, however, a more disturbing pattern starts 
to emerge. What sort of person would stereotypically say "your baby's going to do what? 
lay around...drinking beer?" We would need more evidence to make firm conclusions, 
but this accusation might "echo" with the voices of U.S. welfare critics, who often decry 
the alleged laziness of welfare recipients whom taxpayers must support. This particular 
echo has the potential to shape the verbal interaction among teachers and students, if we 
remember that the students come from a social group often stereotyped as lazy welfare 
recipients (lower class blacks).  
As the class progresses, one teacher does (perhaps inadvertently) position herself 
alongside contemporary U.S. welfare critics. A few minutes later this teacher (T1) says, 
in an animated tone, "but that's the hitch isn't it? you've got this baby that's not healthy
and you're afraid's going to go in the army, and why should the rest of us support your 
baby." Note the teacher's use of us in this utterance. For the first time, she includes 
herself in the example, in a group opposed to Jasmine's. Earlier in the discussion teachers 
and students have attributed a definite voice to Jasmine's baby: He is an unproductive 
freeloader. In this utterance, the teacher presents herself and her social group (whoever is 
included in us) as taxpayers forced to support such freeloaders.
Thus our Bakhtinian analysis of this classroom conversation has uncovered the voices of 
irate taxpayers and welfare recipients, which are indexed in the discussion of the example. 
It has also shown how one of the teachers engages in double voicing and positions herself 
with the welfare critics. The fact that most of these students are lower class blacks also 
makes it possible that they themselves are being positioned - through the too-common 
U.S. stereotype - with Jasmine's hypothetical, unproductive baby. At this point, what 
should the teachers do? Deciding their next move clearly will require judgment, both to 
help students learn and to defuse a potentially damaging interactional situation.6 But will 
such judgment be primarily a matter of knowledge and skills?
CONCLUSION
The character of the foregoing interaction suggests a negative answer to this question. 
Despite the apparently rational or cognitive focus of this classroom conversation, things 
with moral and interactional significance were clearly said. Having been present myself 
during the classroom event, I argue that no one was fully aware of the socio-moral action 
going on. Transcription and analysis have allowed us to see it, but teachers and students 
themselves participated in these events without knowing consciously what they were 
doing. Others have described more fully how people commonly participate in 
interactional events without explicit thought.7 So when teachers use judgment to react at 
this implicit interactional level, they will not have recourse to propositional knowledge.  
But should we not work to prevent teachers from reacting in an unreflective way? 
Shulman argues that teachers ideally make issues explicit and reflect on them. Surely this 
would be the best strategy for the teachers discussing Jasmine's baby. I would agree that 
rational deliberation has an important place in education. But the project to eliminate 
unreflective action in favor of rational deliberation has at least two important 
shortcomings. First, interactional challenges like the one facing Jasmine's teachers often 
happen too quickly for reflection. The person who can quickly make an appropriate 
interactional move is often more interactionally useful than the person who insists on 
thinking every problem through. Second, even the most deliberate rational discussion 
involves dialogic action. (The discussion of Jasmine's baby was cognitively complex and 
quite rational in some respects.) We cannot ever finally escape the interactional 
consequences of our words by using reflection, because all verbal reflection creates more 
action.8
Nonetheless, defenders of knowledge-based approaches might say, we should try to 
insulate the cognitive core of education from the inevitable distractions of interactional 
events. We cannot refute this position definitively. But it seems less plausible in light of 
the deep interconnections between knowledge and action in classroom practice. The 
subject matter of the Spartan babies class, for instance, is woven into the dialogic activity 
surrounding the teachers' position as taxpayers. It is the parallel between roles 
represented in the example and positions in the classroom interaction, after all, that 
allows the interaction to proceed as it does. We could, it must be admitted, describe the 
content about socio-political organization in Sparta, independent of any interactional 
events. But would such a decontextualized representation capture the best teaching 
practice? Perhaps the goal of education should not be simply to communicate knowledge 
and nurture the ability to reflect on it. Schools should prepare students to participate in 
civic life, and this life involves dialogic positioning as well as reflection. Everyday and 
civic discussions of Sparta's political system, for instance, or of current welfare policies, 
inevitably involve complex interactional positioning. The socio-moral "dialogues" 
engendered by any discussion of such subject matter are the very sorts of practices that 
we want to help students participate in. To overlook such interactions in classrooms 
would seem to miss part of the educational point.
For a response to this essay, see Duncan.
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